Embedding explained jury verdicts in the English criminal trial by Coen, M & Doak, J
Embedding Explained Jury Verdicts Legal Studies, 2017 DOI: 10.1111/lest.12174
Embedding Explained Jury Verdicts in the English Criminal Trial
Mark Coen and Jonathan Doak*
University College Dublin and Nottingham Trent University
English juries do not provide reasons for their verdicts. This article argues that transparency  
is a fundamental value in modern decision-making, and that reform is needed to trial by jury  
so that verdicts are routinely accompanied by explanations. It examines the options that exist  
to  incorporate  explained  verdicts  in  the  English  criminal  trial  and  concludes that  
accountability and legitimacy would be enhanced through the use of a trained, independent  
lay facilitator to chair the deliberation process and draft an explained verdict.
INTRODUCTION
The notion of the unexplained verdict1 as a cornerstone of the English jury trial has been 
described as ‘an article of constitutional faith’ by one commentator.2  As with any article of 
faith, it must be scrutinised and justified. Such analysis has only begun in earnest in recent  
years, precipitated by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of 
Taxquet v Belgium.3 This article argues that juries should always justify their verdicts and 
examines how this might be achieved. It begins by discussing the common law convention 
that jury verdicts are not accompanied by reasons. Historical and contemporary exceptions to 
the rule provide examples of instances in which English juries have  provided information 
additional to the simple verdict.  These examples rebut the argument that the common law 
jury is incapable of changing to become more accountable. The article proceeds to consider 
the  benefits  of  introducing  an  explained  verdict,  before  appraising  options  that  might  be 
adopted to achieve this reform.  Our central premise is that jury verdicts have such major  
implications that they should be supported by cogent, publicly-available reasons in all cases.
EXPLAINING THE UNEXPLAINED VERDICT
It is widely known that the options available to contemporary juries are a general verdict of 
‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’.4 As Lord Devlin observed:
1* The authors wish to acknowledge the kind assistance of Liz Campbell, John Jackson and Shane Kilcommins in commenting 
on previous drafts of this article. They also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. 
 The term ‘unexplained verdict’ will be used throughout this article to encapsulate the convention that jury verdicts are not 
accompanied by reasons. The phrase ‘unreasoned verdict’ is used in much of the literature, but the term ‘unexplained verdict’ is 
arguably clearer.
2 P Roberts, ‘Does Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Require Reasoned Verdicts in Criminal Trials?’ 
(2011) 11(2) Human Rights Law Review 213 at 216. See also Ex p Harrington [1884] TLR 435, where Stephen J stated that 
magistrates who had refused to grant a theatre licence ‘were no more bound to give their reasons...than a jury were bound to 
give reasons for their verdict’. Ibid, p 437.
3  ECtHR 13 January 2009 and (2012) 54 EHRR 26 (Grand Chamber). The Taxquet decision is discussed below.
4 In Scotland there is an additional verdict, namely ‘not proven’. See P Duff, ‘The Not Proven Verdict; Jury Mythology and 
“Moral Panics”’ (1996) Juridical Review 1. In 2016 the merits of this third verdict were debated in the Scottish media and the 
Scottish Parliament. See, for example, ‘Bid to scrap “not proven” verdict from Scots courts fails’, available at: 
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Judges give their reasons, either so as to satisfy the parties or because they themselves 
want to justify their judgments...The jury just says yes or no. Indeed, it is not allowed 
to expand upon that and its reasons may not be inquired into. It is the oracle deprived 
of the right of being ambiguous.5
While  some  commentators  have  highlighted  the  dangers  posed  by  the  apparent 
unaccountability  of  the  jury,6 this  feature  of  the  criminal  justice  process  is  largely 
unquestioned, as exemplified by Humphreys J in R v Larkin:7
In this country we consider that a jury is the best possible tribunal yet devised for  
deciding whether or not a man is guilty...but no one has ever suggested that a jury is 
composed of persons who are likely at a moment's notice to be able to give a logical 
explanation of how and why they arrived at their verdict.8
Williams characterised this  statement  as  encapsulating ‘the usual  sentimental  credentials’9 
attributed to the jury. In Larkin the trial judge had asked the foreman of the jury on what basis 
the verdict of manslaughter had been returned. The Court of Appeal made it clear that juries  
should never be asked to explain their verdicts, unless the verdict itself is unclear. As will be  
seen, that principle has since been revisited by the Court of Appeal in the limited context of  
manslaughter verdicts.
Various rationales may be invoked to account for the non-provision of reasons by 
juries, with many lying deeply buried in the institution’s history. The jury evolved from a 
body whose members had personal knowledge of the facts and which could gather evidence 
on its own motion to the disinterested fact-finder we know today.10 According to Jackson: ‘So 
long as jurors acted on their own knowledge their verdicts could continue to be given a kind  
of oracular authority’.11 The proximity of the early jurors to the circumstances of the case 
imbued their decision with legitimacy and ‘social accountability.’12 Another historical factor 
for the unexplained verdict stems from the belief that jury verdicts were ‘divinely inspired.’ 13 
Hence, it would be inappropriate to require justification of the God-directed outcome. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-35659541 (accessed 24/1/2017). 
5 P Devlin, Trial by Jury (London: Methuen, 1966) pp 13-14.
6 See eg, P Darbyshire, ‘The Lamp That Shows That Freedom Lives – Is it Worth the Candle?’ [1991] Crim LR 740 at 748; J 
Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Stevens & Sons, 1949) 171-178; G Maher, ‘The Verdict of the Jury’ in M Findlay and P 
Duff (eds) The Jury Under Attack (London: Butterworths, 1988) 40 at 44-45; R. J. O’Hanlon, ‘The Sacred Cow of Trial by 
Jury’ (1990) 27 Irish Jurist 57 at 66; E R Sunderland, ‘Verdicts, General and Special’ (1920) 29(3) Yale LJ 253 at 258-260; G 
Williams, The Proof of Guilt: A Study of the English Criminal Trial (London: Stevens & Sons, 2nd edn, 1958) 278.
7 R v Larkin [1943] KB 174.
8 Ibid, p 176.
9 Williams, above n  6, p 277. 
10 See further D Klerman, ‘Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?’ in M Mulholland and B Pullan (eds) Judicial Tribunals in 
England and Europe, 1200-1700 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) 58; M Macnair, ‘Vicinage and the 
Antecedents of the Jury’ (1999) 17(3) Law and History Review 537.
11 J D Jackson, ‘Making Juries Accountable’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 477 at 490.
12 Ibid, p 529.
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The unexplained verdict may owe its existence to the perception that the process of 
arriving at a decision is produced by the ‘feel’ the jurors have for the case, and an acceptance 
that this may not be possible to articulate. A further rationale can be found in the notion of  
jury nullification, or ‘jury equity’, whereby jurors return a verdict which is contrary to the law 
or the evidence. The highly controversial ability of jurors to nullify, which is perceived by  
some as one of the safeguards of the accused and by others as an aberration whereby jurors 
place themselves above the law,14 is clearly facilitated by the non-provision of reasons.15
Whatever its precise origins, the unexplained verdict is closely related to the common 
law secrecy rule. That rule prevents disclosure or investigation of a jury’s deliberations and 
would obviously be violated by the provision of reasons. In Ellis v Deheer16  the judges of the 
Court  of  Appeal  were unanimous  that  evidence could not  be received of  what  transpired 
between jurors when considering their verdict, including the reasons for such verdict. While 
Bankes LJ decried any investigation of ‘the reasons for [the jurors']  decision’, 17 Atkin LJ 
referred to the inadmissibility for any purpose of ‘the grounds upon which the verdict was 
given.’18 For His Lordship, the object of the rule was ‘to protect the jurymen themselves and 
prevent their being exposed to pressure to explain the reasons which actuated them in arriving 
at their verdict’.19 
The foregoing analysis indicates that it is impossible to identify a definitive historical  
cause for the convention that most jury verdicts are unaccompanied by reasons. In addition, 
judges and authors such as Lord Devlin have tended to accord this convention a status more  
akin to an absolute rule. The next section will demonstrate that such a viewpoint ignores the  
historical reality whereby jurors were not confined to the returning of simple verdicts devoid 
of further information. 
ILLUMNINATING VERDICTS – SOME OVERLOOKED DEVICES
While the law has not required juries to give reasons, modern criminal justice discourse fails  
to  reflect  the  fact  that  this  rule  was  never  absolute.  Until  the  eighteenth  century  judges 
sometimes asked juries to provide the rationale for verdicts, particularly in instances in which 
they disagreed with the outcome.20 Such requests often preceded a direction from the judge 
13 A S Goldstein, ‘Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Post-Verdict Interviews’ (1993) University of Illinois Law 
Review 295 at 295.
14 For an overview of the harms and benefits of nullification see N S Marder, ‘The Myth of the Nullifying Jury’ (1999) 93 
Northwestern University Law Review 877 at 926-943.
15 T Brooks, ‘A Defence of Jury Nullification’ (2004) 10(4) Res Publica 401 at 402.
16 [1922] 2 KB 113.
17 Ibid. p 118.
18 Ibid, p 121.  Warrington LJ agreed.
19 Ibid. Other, more dubious rationales for the secrecy rule include the need for finality in respect of verdicts and the 
preservation of confidence in the jury system. For a critique of these rationales, see J Jaconelli, Open Justice: A Critique of the 
Public Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 235-262 and M McHugh, ‘Jurors’ Deliberations, Jury Secrecy, Public 
Policy and the Law of Contempt’ in Findlay and Duff , above  n 6, p 56 and  pp 62-67.  
20 C Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 3; J H Langbein, ‘The 
Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers’ (1978) 45(2) University of Chicago Law Review 263 at 289.
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for the jury to deliberate again.21 This practice appears to have vanished by the nineteenth 
century. By then, the role of the judge had evolved to police  the application of the newly-
emerging laws of evidence, rather than discussing the merits  of  individual  cases with the 
jurors.22 Other mechanisms for the provision of insight into jury decision-making have also 
existed. These are significant in the context of the debate about jury accountability, because 
they  demonstrate  that  elaboration  upon  the  general  verdict  is  not  a  foreign  concept  in 
England. Indeed, examples of explanations for verdicts can be found by reference to three 
particular devices: special verdicts, jury riders and explained verdicts in manslaughter cases.
One practice deviating from the general verdict of guilty or not guilty was the special  
verdict, which remained intact well into the twentieth century. Defined as ‘a verdict in which 
the jury decided the facts but left  the court to determine whether those facts gave rise to 
criminal liability’,23 jurors could return a special verdict when they had ‘doubts respecting any 
particular point of criminal law’24 and wanted to leave legal quagmires to the trial judge. The 
special verdict could also be an instrument of judicial control of juries in controversial trials,  
including seditious libel  prosecutions25 and the infamous  murder  trial  of  R v Dudley and  
Stephens.26 The jury would be asked to determine a specific question or number of questions, 
with the judge formulating a general verdict informed by the answers. In England the special  
verdict is almost never used today; in R v Solomon,27 it was stated that ‘the jury cannot bring 
in a special  verdict.  The verdicts open to them are guilty or not  guilty’.28 This view was 
echoed by Lord Hobhouse in  R v Mirza29: ‘Under the common law system of jury trial, all 
findings of fact are to be made by the jury and it  is ultimately their  decision whether to  
convict the defendant. Special verdicts may not be asked for’.30
A further means by which juries could provide information additional to the verdict 
was by issuing a rider. A rider consisted of an addendum to the verdict, detailing the jury’s  
opinion on some aspect of the case. These were attached to verdicts on an ad hoc basis and 
were quite common, largely because an automatic sentence of death followed convictions for 
certain  offences,  (in  the  twentieth  century,  notably  murder).  The  rider  could  highlight  a 
particular issue such as the jury’s views of the behaviour of the accused or the police. 31 The 
use of riders declined steadily in the latter half of the twentieth century, to the extent that it is 
now almost  unknown. An exception was the trial of the Earl of Hardwicke for supplying  
cocaine.  The jury passed a  note  to  the  judge stating that  it  would have acquitted him if 
permitted by law. The peer had supplied the drug to an undercover newspaper reporter and  
21 Langbein, ibid, p 291. 
22 J H Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p 321.
23 Ibid, p 329.
24 C M Cottu, On the Administration of the Criminal Code, in England, and the Spirit of the English Government 
(London:1820) p 54.
25 Langbein, above n 22, p 329. 
26 [1884] 14 QBD 273.
27 (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 120.
28 Ibid, p 126.
29 [2004] 1 AC 1118.
30 Ibid, p 1166. 
31 For an example of a rider in which a jury implied misconduct on the part of the police see ‘Sheffield Bribery Charges’ The 
Times (London, 5 April 1930).
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the jury described the use of such covert methods as ‘extreme provocation’.32 Having regard 
to  ‘the  jury’s  clearly  stated  views’,33 the  trial  judge  suspended  Hardwicke’s  two-year 
sentence. In an unsuccessful appeal against conviction on the basis that the evidence against  
him was obtained through an abuse of process, counsel for Hardwicke referred to the rider ‘as 
an  indication  that,  to  the  minds  of  twelve  well  informed  lay  people,  the  investigatory 
procedure adopted here did amount to an affront to the public conscience’. 34 In the Scottish 
case of HM Advocate v Tracey,35 Lord Uist referred to the ability of jurors to append riders, 
observing: ‘It is not a practice which appears to have been subjected to any close analysis and 
it is one on which no authoritative guidance has been given’.36 
Aside from riders,  there is  clear common law authority for the proposition that  a 
judge may ask a  jury to explain a manslaughter conviction where there  are  a number  of  
potential factual bases for the verdict. In a particular case the verdict may be open to multiple  
interpretations; the jury might have found gross negligence, a lack of intention to kill or cause 
serious  harm,  or  the  presence of  the  reductive  defences  of  loss  of  control  or  diminished 
responsibility. In R v Cawthorne37 the Court of Appeal reviewed conflicting authorities as to 
whether juries should be questioned where the basis of a manslaughter verdict is uncertain, 
and  held that  this  was entirely for  the  discretion  of  the  trial  judge.  The exercise  of  this  
discretion would not be questioned on appeal, ‘save in the most exceptional circumstances’, 38 
on which the court did not elaborate. 
The practice authorised by Cawthorne arguably involves a breach of the common law 
secrecy rule confirmed in  R v Mirza,39 which provides that judges cannot enquire into the 
deliberations of a jury after the verdict has been delivered.40 The relevance of the procedure to 
the  present  article  is  that  although narrowly linked to  the  judicial  sentencing function,  it  
nevertheless  illustrates that  the  aversion  to  asking  juries  for  verdict  explanations  is  not 
absolute.
The procedures outlined above indicate that it is wrong to conceive of the jury as a  
body forever confined to the limited vocabulary of ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’. The article now 
builds on this analysis by considering the benefits of introducing explained verdicts, before 
evaluating a number of methods by which this might be accomplished.
THE CASE FOR EXPLAINED VERDICTS
Whilst the foregoing analysis reveals that certain forms of jury verdicts have not been entirely 
devoid of reasons, there is no doubt that the archetypal verdict at common law still tells us 
32 R v Hardwicke (CA, 10 November 2000), para 10.
33 L Gregoriadis, ‘Judge frees peer caught in tabloid drug sting’ The Guardian (London, 23 September 1999).
34 Hardwicke, above n 32, para 19.
35 [2008] SCL 543. 
36 Ibid, p 553.
37 (1996) 2 Cr App Rep (S) 445.
38  Ibid, p 451. 
39 [2004] 1 AC 1118. 
40 Mirza contains an exception to this rule which permits the investigation of misconduct which is extraneous to the 
deliberations, but that exception is not relevant in the current context. For analysis of the Mirza decision, see N Haralambous, 
‘Investigating Impropriety in Jury Deliberations: A Recipe for Disaster?’ (2004) 68(5) Journal of Criminal Law 411; R 
Ferguson, ‘The Criminal Jury in England and Scotland: the Confidentiality Principle and the Investigation of Impropriety’ 
(2006) 10 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 180.
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nothing about how or why the jurors reach their conclusions. Provided jurors act bona fide 
and do not  engage in  misconduct,41 their  verdict  is  subject  to  little  oversight.  There  are, 
however, questions about the long-term feasibility of retaining this approach. While the focus 
of this article is not squarely on the issue of jury nullification, where the jury disregards the  
law to reach what  it  regards as a fair  outcome,42 it  is  important  to acknowledge that  our 
proposal for explained jury verdicts is informed by a perspective that regards such action by 
jurors as illegitimate and contrary to the law as formulated by parliament and the judiciary. If 
our  model  of  explained  verdicts  were  adopted,  verdict  reasons  indicating  that  jurors  had 
disregarded the law in arriving at that verdict would be a ground of appeal. We now turn to 
the arguments that we believe justify the introduction of explained verdicts.
The  obvious  consequence  of  decision-making  without  reasons  is  a  lack  of 
transparency. Transparency is strongly associated with the notions of both natural justice and 
a fair hearing since,  without it,  parties would be unable to protect their  rights.43 As Lord 
Denning put it: ‘The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration’.44 
Recently the notion of transparency has emerged as a core benchmark of good practice in 
relation to liberal criminal justice systems. In England and Wales, duties to provide reasons  
exist inter alia in the context of the arrest of a suspect;45 the refusal to grant bail;46 the failure 
to proceed with certain prosecutions;47 the admission of bad character evidence at trial;48 the 
sentencing of an offender;49 and the referral of a case to the Court of Appeal by the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission.50 Critically for present purposes, magistrates must give reasons if 
they convict an accused.51 There is thus something intuitively anomalous about the presence 
41 For examples of jury misconduct, see Attorney General v Fraill (2011) 2 Cr App Rep 21; Attorney General v Pardon [2012] 
EWHC 3402 (Admin); Attorney General v Dallas (2012) 1 Cr App R 32; Attorney General v Davey (2014) 1 Cr App R 1. 
While jurors may be punished for such misconduct it is quite difficult to have a verdict set aside on the basis of alleged juror 
misbehaviour. See above, n 40. 
42 See above, n 14 and n 15. 
43 It is a general principle of good practice across many different fields of public law that decisions which adversely affect 
members of the public should always be accompanied by reasons.  Although there is no general common law duty to give 
reasons in English administrative law (see R (on the application of Hasan) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2009] 3 
All ER 539), such an obligation is widely found in statute and the common law has established many such individual duties: see 
generally P Craig, ‘The Common Law, Reasons and Administrative Justice’ (1994) 53(2) Cambridge Law Journal  282; M 
Cohen, ‘Reason-Giving in Court Practice: Decision-Makers at the Crossroads’ (2007) 14 Columbia Journal of European Law 
257.  Under Article 296 of the Treaty of the European Union, all institutions are under an obligation to give reasons for all legal 
measures.  
44 Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175 at 191.
45 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 28(3).
46 Bail Act 1976, s 5(3)(a). In certain cases the granting of bail also carries a duty to provide reasons: s 5(2A).
47 In R v DPP, ex p Manning [2001] QB 330 it was held that whilst the Director of Public Prosecutions was not under a general 
duty to provide reasons for a decision not to prosecute, it was reasonable to do so where no compelling grounds suggested 
otherwise. In circumstances where an individual had died whilst in the custody of the State and a properly directed inquest had 
reached a verdict of unlawful killing, reasons should have been given for a decision not to prosecute.
48 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 110.
49 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 174 as amended by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s 64(2).
50 Criminal Appeals Act 1995, s 14(4).
51 Criminal Procedure Rule 24.3(5)(a).
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of the unexplained jury verdict in the criminal justice system, and the lack of transparency 
raises three specific concerns: legitimacy, popular consent and the quality of justice.
Transparency is inextricably linked to the issue of legitimacy. Whilst transparency is 
increased through lay participation, it is also undermined by the secrecy surrounding 
deliberations52 and the lack of an explained verdict. Part of the jury’s raison d'être is the 
legitimation of the criminal justice process through civic participation and democratisation; 
hence it has long been considered to act as a check against abuse of power by the state.53 
However, the secret operation of the jury places it at odds with modern expectations of good 
decision-making, and threatens its status as a defender of rights. The New Zealand Law 
Commission recognised this in 2012, stating: ‘Even if [jurors’] reasoning process cannot be 
faulted, the veil of secrecy leaves room for speculation that they were improperly influenced 
by irrelevant considerations and thus undermines public confidence in the outcome’.54
 The secrecy rule attaching to jury deliberations serves very important functions 
including the encouragement of candid discussions in the jury room, the protection of jurors 
from pressure and the prevention of the publication of juror interviews and memoirs. 
However, it also restricts society’s ability to assess the functioning of the jury system. Section 
8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 on the disclosure of jury deliberations has been replaced 
by section 20D of the Juries Act 1974, which is worded in a similar way to its predecessor. It 
makes it an offence ‘to disclose information about statements made, opinions expressed, 
arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in 
proceedings before a court, or…to solicit or obtain such information.’55 While research 
conducted by Thomas suggests that the vast majority of jurors perform their duties diligently and 
lawfully,56 and demonstrates the wide variety of simulation and interview-based jury research that 
could be done within the confines of section 8, the fact remains that jurors could not, and may not, 
be interviewed about their deliberations in real cases. Thomas argues that the interviewing of 
former jurors about their deliberations is not a useful methodology, because the answers are 
unlikely to be reliable, especially if an unfair consideration like the race of the accused has been a 
factor.57 Other academics dispute this, referring to the current impermissibility of asking those 
who have acted as jurors about the ‘evidential factors, credibility assessments and factual 
assumptions’58 that shaped the real trials that they participated in.  The Law Commission 
recognised the potential value of this type of research in 2013, when it recommended that the law 
be amended to permit the interviewing of jurors about deliberations in actual cases for approved 
academic purposes;59 a recommendation that was not acted upon by Parliament. The ban on 
52 For discussion of the jury secrecy rule see McHugh, above n 19; Jaconelli, above n 19.
53 J Jackson, ‘Judicial Responsibility in Criminal Proceedings’ (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 59 at 90. See further T 
Brooks, ‘The Right to Trial by Jury’ (2004) 21(2) Journal of Applied Philosophy 197; F Davis, ‘The Jury as a Political 
Institution in an Age of Counterterrorism’ (2013) 33(1) Politics 5; H L Ho, ‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ (2010) 
32 Sydney Law Review 269.
54 New Zealand Law Commission, Alternative Pre-Trial and Trial Processes: Possible Reforms (Issues Paper 30, 2012) 24. 
55 Juries Act 1974, s 20D as inserted by s 74(1) Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. 
56 C Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (London: Ministry of Justice, 2010).  
57 C Thomas, “Exposing the Myth” (2013) Counsel 25 at 26.
58 The quotation is taken from the views expressed by Professors Ellison and Munro to the Law Commission. Law 
Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (2013) p 97.
59 Ibid, p 102. 
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certain types of         properly-conducted inquiry, embodied in the current law, strengthens the 
case for explained verdicts.  
The acceptance of  jury verdicts,  based on their  perceived legitimacy,  depends on 
social consent. Such consent derives from the belief that procedures that are just and proper  
ought to be followed.60 Without  popular consent, law and policy risk being undermined and 
contested.61 The institution of the jury has enjoyed widespread popular support.62 However, in 
an age where the accountability of public institutions  is  expected and valued,63 increased 
public debate about the role of the jury, combined with future negative press coverage, could 
diminish public  confidence in  the  institution.  Over  the  years  there  has  been considerable 
debate as to whether juries should try certain types of cases.64  There have also been a number 
of widely reported cases involving jury misconduct,65 which prompted a Law Commission 
report  and the enactment  of  offences  to  deal  with jurors  who behave improperly. 66 Juror 
incompetence has also been flagged as a potential issue in the press; in February 2013 there 
was widespread negative media coverage in relation to a list of apparently bizarre questions 
posed by the jury to the judge in the highly publicised trial of Vicky Pryce for perverting the 
60 See M Zelditch, ‘Processes of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions’ (2001) Social Psychology 
Quarterly 4.
61 T R Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’ in M Tonry (ed) Crime and Justice: A Review of 
Research, Volume 30 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) p 283.
62 J Roberts and M Hough, Public Opinion and the Jury: An International Literature Review (London: Ministry of Justice 
Research Series 1/09, 2009) pp 12-19.
63 Jackson, ‘Making Juries Accountable’, above n 11, pp 486-487.
64 There has been considerable debate over the past three decades in relation to the capacity of juries to try complex fraud cases. 
See for example, R Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (London: HMSO, 2001) 200-204; Fraud Trials 
Committee Report (London: HMSO, 1986) paras 8.47-8.51; Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (London: HMSO, 1993) pp 
136-137; Juries in Serious Fraud Trials: A Consultation Document (London: Home Office 1998); R F Julian, ‘Judicial 
Perspectives on the Conduct of Serious Fraud Trials’ [2007] Crim LR 751. Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which 
was repealed by section 113 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, would have permitted the prosecution to apply for a trial 
without a jury in fraud trials. 
65 See for example, ‘Inquiry into “use of Ouija Board” by Jurors’ The Independent (24 June 1994);  U Khan, ‘Juror Dismissed 
from a Trial after Using Facebook to Help Make a Decision’ The Daily Telegraph (24 November 2008);  J Taylor, ‘Juror Jailed 
for Contempt After Jetting Off to Malta’ The Independent (5 April 2011); A Hough, ‘Juror in Facebook Contempt Prosecution 
after “Contacting Defendant During Trial”’ The Daily Telegraph (13 June 2011);  ‘Juror, 19, Jailed for Halting Trial to Visit 
Theatre’ The Guardian (22 December 2011); O Bowcott, ‘Juror Jailed over Online Research’ The Guardian (24 January 2012). 
See further C Thomas, ‘Avoiding the Perfect Storm of Juror Contempt’ [2013] Crim LR 483.
66 See Law Commission, above n 56, and Part 3 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.  
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course  of  justice.67 Although  incompetent  or  unethical  practice  likely  occurs  in  a  small  
minority of cases, the reporting of such instances underlines the need for greater transparency.
In addition to countering this risk of lowering public confidence, explained verdicts 
may be supported on the basis that they might bolster the quality of justice, insofar as they 
would  serve as a process  check on  jurors becoming  more readily  exposed to extraneous 
material, particularly via the Internet.68 Coupled with increasingly relaxed evidentiary rules 
concerning the forms of evidence that can be presented at trial,69 as ‘ input’ control on the 
trial declines, so the need for a greater degree of ‘output’ control arises:
The  more  relaxed  the  evidentiary  standards  become,  however,  with  ever  less 
probative and more  potentially prejudicial  evidence entrusted into the jury’s  care 
(albeit  under  evidentiary instruction),  the  more  an adversarial  deficit  is  likely to 
emerge in terms of the parties’ ability to challenge how exactly such evidence was 
handled in the closed confines of the deliberation room. 70
As Jackson argues, explained verdicts may enhance the overall quality of justice in that 
they might ‘ensure that no adversarial deficit is created by any unreasoned verdict that 
emerges.’71 Defendants and  victims would thereby be provided with the reassurance 
that, even if  they  are  displeased  with  the  outcome,  the  trier  of  fact  conducted  itself  
diligently and acted in accordance with the law.72 Moreover,  knowing the basis  for the 
decision would assist both the defence and prosecution in understanding the range of appeal  
67 The jury was discharged after failing to agree a verdict. The trial judge stated that the questions asked by the jurors 
demonstrated ‘absolutely fundamental deficits in understanding’: F Hamilton, ‘Pryce Trial Collapses Amid Doubt over Jury’ 
The Times (21 February 2013). The case led to considerable debate in the national media. See for example, R Sabey, ‘Pryce 
Retrial after Jury Farce’ The Sun (21 February 2013); M Phillips, ‘Do we Need IQ Tests for Juries? Vicky Pryce Trial has 
Exposed a Breathtaking Level of Ignorance and Stupidity’ The Daily Mail (21 February 2013); E Branagh, ‘Stupid Jurors cause 
Vicky Price Retrial’ The Daily Star (21 February 2013).  For an academic perspective, see S Lubet and K Chang, ‘Stupid Juror 
Questions?’ 37 American Journal of Trial Advocacy 315.
68 Law Commission, above n 56; J  Jackson, ‘Unbecoming Jurors and Unreasoned Verdicts: Realising Integrity in the Jury 
Room’ in D Dixon, J Hunter, P Roberts and S Young (eds) Integrity in Criminal Process (Oxford: Hart, 2016) p 281.        
69 Recent examples of a relaxation in evidentiary controls are contained in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provided for a 
major erosion of the rule against hearsay and the more widespread admissibility of character evidence. 
70 Jackson, ‘Unbecoming Jurors’, above n 66, p 301.
71 Ibid. 
72 While defendants might well be the primary beneficiaries of explained verdicts, it is arguable that victims ought to be able to 
exercise a similar ‘right to know’ or ‘right to truth’ within the criminal justice system. This would be a reflection of wider 
trends concerning the expansion of victims’ rights in human rights and transitional justice settings and arguably builds on the 
‘right to information’ contained in Articles 3-7 of European Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the 
rights, support and protection of victims of crime. See further J Doak, ‘Enriching Trial Justice for Victims of Crime: Lessons 
from Transitional Environments’ (2015) 15(2) International Review of Victimology 139–160.
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options that may be available,73 which was expressly recognised by the Strasbourg Court in 
Murray v UK:74
[I]n Northern Ireland, where trial judges sit without a jury, the judge must explain the 
reasons for the decision to draw inferences and the weight attached to them.  The 
exercise of discretion in this regard is subject to review by the appellate courts.75
In the absence of an explained decision, appellate courts faced with arguments that particular 
verdicts are perverse or inconsistent with each other engage in a somewhat unreal exercise 
which purports to identify the reasoning of the jury. In the words of Dyson LJ: ‘Since juries 
do not give reasons for their verdicts...the interpretation of their verdicts often involves what  
might  be termed “speculation”’.76 As  Lord Steyn acknowledged in  Mirza,  maintaining the 
position of ‘we shall never know’ does not sit easily alongside modern conceptions of fairness 
and due process in the criminal justice system.77 However, as the law stands, an appeal court 
cannot  interfere  on  the  basis  of  perversity  or  inconsistency as  long  as  ‘it  is  possible  to 
postulate a rational line of reasoning’78 in the verdicts given. The threshold which must be 
crossed before the Court of Appeal will quash a verdict in such cases has been described as ‘a 
very high hurdle’.79 An appellant must persuade the Court of Appeal that the inconsistency 
between verdicts can only be explained by confusion or a wrong approach to the evidence on 
the part of the jury.80 The absence of an explanation by the jury of different verdicts on similar 
counts contributes significantly to the severity of this threshold, and allows the perception of  
unfairness or arbitrariness to flourish.
A RIGHT TO AN EXPLAINED VERDICT?
Notwithstanding these arguments, there was, until recently, little consideration of the need for 
reform  of  the  unexplained  verdict.  However,  the  issue  became  very  prominent  in  the 
aftermath of the decision of the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Taxquet v Belgium.81 Here the applicant complained that his right to a fair trial under Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated because the jury had failed 
to give reasons for its decision to convict the defendant of murder. Article 337 of the Belgian 
Criminal Code provided for a ‘structured verdict’ whereby the presiding judge submitted a list 
73 M Coen, ‘“With Cat-Like Tread”: Jury Trial and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2014) Human Rights Law Review 1 
at 16; J Jackson and N P Kovalev, ‘Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe’ (2006) 13 Columbia J. of European Law 83 
at 115-116.
74  (1996) 22 EHRR 29.
75 Ibid, p 62.
76 R v PAR [2001] EWCA Crim 1060, para 33. For another reference to the unexplained verdict in an appeal relating to such a 
verdict, see R v George [2005] EWCA Crim 1095, para 59 (Hooper LJ). 
77 Mirza, above n 39, p 1133.
78 Ibid. 
79 R v P [2009] EWCA Crim 2732, para 17 (Elias LJ). 
80 R v Lewis (Rhys Thomas) [2010] EWCA Crim 496, para 47 (Moore-Bick LJ). 
81 ECtHR 13 January 2009 and (2012) 54 EHRR 26 (Grand Chamber).
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of formal questions, based on the text of the indictment, to which the panel of nine lay jurors  
had to give answers. Thus, in Taxquet’s case, a total of 32 questions were posed by the judge 
which largely concerned the core elements of murder and attempted murder, and to which the 
jury responded with monosyllabic ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. 
Taxquet’s complaint was upheld by the Court on the basis that ‘such laconic answers 
to vague and general questions could have left the applicant with an impression of arbitrary  
justice lacking in transparency’.82 The bottom line, essentially,  was that the defendant was 
unable to understand the reasoning behind the verdict which was of vital importance since 
such reasons would be the basis upon which he decided to accept the verdict or consider an 
appeal. Given the centrality of the jury system to a number of European jurisdictions, and the 
hitherto apparent dismissal of previous arguments relating to the provision of reasons,83 the 
Taxquet  decision sent ripples of unease around a number of signatory states, with fears that 
both the common law jury and its continental counterpart84 could be under threat. The Belgian 
decision to pursue an appeal before the Grand Chamber was unsurprising, as were the third 
party interventions of the governments of the United Kingdom, Ireland and France.85  
The decision of the Grand Chamber, delivered in November 2010, upheld the ruling 
of the Court against Belgium, but also gave some measure of relief to those who had feared,  
by implication, that the common law jury model might also be under threat. It affirmed that 
‘the Convention does not require jurors to give reasons for their decision and that Article 6 
does not preclude a defendant from being tried by a lay jury even where reasons are not given 
for the verdict’.86 This was subject to other safeguards being observed:
Such  procedural  safeguards  may  include,  for  example,  directions  or  guidance 
provided  by  the  presiding  judge  to  the  jurors  on  the  legal  issues  arising  or  the 
evidence adduced… and precise, unequivocal questions put to the jury by the judge, 
forming a framework on which the verdict is based or sufficiently offsetting the fact 
that no reasons are given for the jury’s answers… Lastly, regard must be had to any 
avenues of appeal open to the accused.87
The Grand Chamber proceeded to state that the nature of the questions posed to the jury in 
Taxquet’s case were inadequate to such an extent that the applicant would have been unable  
to understand why he was found guilty.88 The decision may have prompted a collective sigh 
of relief among supporters of the jury and policymakers in common law jurisdictions, since, 
from a legal perspective, the earlier approach in Saric v Denmark89 seems to have prevailed, 
namely that carefully crafted judicial directions and summing up serve to offset the absence 
of an explained verdict. The Grand Chamber’s characterisation of these features of a criminal  
82 ECtHR 13 January 2009, para 63.
83 See Saric v Denmark (ECtHR, 2 February 1999); Papon v France (ECtHR, 15 November 2001).
84 For a discussion of the diverse jury systems present in the States party to the European Convention on Human Rights, see 
Jackson and Kovalev, above n 71, pp 93-100.
85 ECtHR, 13 January 2009, paras 71-82.
86 (2012) 54 EHRR 26 at 956.
87 Ibid, pp 956-957.
88 Ibid, pp 957-958.
89 ECtHR, 2 February 1999.
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trial as transparency safeguards has been criticised.90 They do not provide insights into why a 
particular  verdict  has  been reached,  which was the core problem identified by the Grand 
Chamber  in  Taxquet’s  case.   As  Lippke  asserts,  even  if  a  formal  right  to  an  explained 
decision cannot be located in law, ‘it is hardly a stretch to see such a requirement  as  an 
implication of the moral right to trial’.91 This, he argues, means that guilty verdicts by juries 
ought to be justified by clear and adequate reasons.
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE DELIBERATION
It seems that the Taxquet litigation - coupled with increased academic debate on the issue –
has prompted efforts to formulate a more coherent framework as to how juries conduct their  
fact-finding role. In England and Wales there have been changes in the ways  that  judges  
direct juries, with a tendency for judges to offer written directions in addition to the oral 
guidance.92 Auld L.J. had recommended something akin to this in his 2001 report.93 In 2010 
the Judicial Studies Board endorsed the practice of trial judges providing jurors with a written 
‘route to verdict’, essentially amounting to a flowchart or question-based decision-tree to aid 
their deliberation process.94 A study conducted by Cheryl Thomas in 2012-13 found that 70 
per cent of the jurors surveyed had received written directions from the judge, with every 
juror reporting that they found these helpful.95 Route to verdict aids may assist the jury in 
navigating the complexity of the interface between legal rules and the fact-finding process,  
particularly in those cases where ‘there are several possible bases for conviction, or several 
possible offences, or defences to consider’.96 Their usefulness is emphasised in  The Crown 
Court Compendium97 and the Criminal Practice Directions.98 In his  Review of Efficiency in  
Criminal Proceedings,99 Sir Brian Leveson recommended the use of such aids in all cases, not 
merely those with particularly complex facts or aspects of law: 
90 Coen, above n 71, p 19. 
91 R L Lippke, ‘The Case for Reasoned Criminal Trial Verdicts’ (2009) 22(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 313 
at 318 (emphasis added).
92 N Madge, ‘Summing Up: A Judge’s Perspective’ [2006] Crim LR 817 at 821-822. Judges are expressly empowered under 
the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014 to give directions and questions in writing: Crim PR r 38.14(3).
93 Auld, above n 62, p 172.
94 Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury (2010). 
95 Thomas, ‘Avoiding’, above n 63, p 497.
96 R v Thompson (2010) 2 Cr App Rep 27 at 267. 
97 Judicial College, The Crown Court Compendium Part 1: Legal Summaries, Directions and Examples (2016), available at: 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/crown-court-compendium-pt1-legal-summaries-directions-
examples-20160511.pdf (accessed 24/1/2017), pp 1-7 – 1-9. 
98 The Criminal Practice Directions 2015 Amendment No 1 [2016] EWCA Crim 97 states: ‘Save where the case is so 
straightforward that it would be superfluous to do so, the judge should provide a written route to verdict. It may be presented 
(on paper or digitally) in the form of text, bullet points, a flowchart or other graphic.’
99 B Leveson, Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings (2015), available at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/review-of-efficiency-in-criminal-proceedings-20151.pdf (accessed 24/1/2017). 
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The Judge should devise and put to the jury a series of written factual questions, the 
answers to which logically lead to an appropriate verdict in the case. Each question 
should be tailored to the law as the Judge understands it to be and to the issues and 
evidence in the case. These questions — the ‘route to verdict’ — should be clear 
enough that the defendant (and the public) may understand the basis for the verdict  
that has been reached.100 
The second sentence is problematic because it repeats the sleight of hand relied upon by the 
Grand Chamber in Taxquet itself, namely the equation of jury directions and transparent jury 
decision-making. Although the provision of steps to verdict aids may assist the jury in 
arriving at the verdict, it falls far short of an explained verdict in that there is no means of 
ascertaining how or why the jury reached its decision. Thus the deliberation process remains 
closed in the sense that neither defendants nor the public are given a window into the reasons 
underlying the jury’s determination.  In  our  v iew,  t here is a strong normative case for 
introducing a more transparent form of explained verdict into the criminal trial and the 
section that follows will consider how this might be done.
MODELS FOR THE PROVISION OF REASONS
The most obvious, and perhaps efficient, means of embedding explained verdicts in criminal  
trials would be to abolish juries and transfer the responsibility of making decisions as to guilt,  
accompanied  by  reasons,  to  professional  judges.  This  juryless  approach  is  relatively 
commonplace in Europe, and has been used in Ireland and Northern Ireland with the Special 
Criminal  Court  and  the  ‘Diplock’  Courts  respectively.  In  2012  the  New  Zealand  Law 
Commission  suggested that  juries be replaced by panels consisting of one judge and two 
jurors,  who  would  deliberate  together  and  provide  reasons  for  their  verdicts.  One 
consideration  underpinning  this  proposal  was  the  fact  that  the  current  lay  jury  does  not  
provide reasons.101 However, the jury retains a high level of popular support,102 and the right 
to  trial  by jury is  rightly valued  as  fundamental  legal  right  which should not  be  readily 
dispensed  with.  Working  therefore  from  the  premise  that  lay  participation  is  generally 
something that ought to be enhanced rather than restricted in the criminal justice system, we 
now consider different ways in which some form of explained verdict might be incorporated 
in the common law legal framework. To this end, we will appraise three options for reform:  
(a) recording deliberations; (b) adopting a mixed panel approach; and (c) lay facilitation.
(a) Recording deliberations
One of the most straightforward, if radical, means to ascertain the reasons underlying verdicts  
would be to install a recording facility within the jury room. This could be done by a simple  
voice recorder,  a  camera  or  even through the use of  a  traditional  stenographer.  Such an 
arrangement would have the immediate effect of eradicating any pretence that the content of 
discussions would remain secret. Whilst eavesdropping on the jury has long been prohibited 
100 Ibid, p 79. 
101 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 52, p 26.
102 Roberts and Hough, above n 60, pp 12-23.
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under the common law,103  it formed part of an infamous experiment within a federal district 
court in Kansas in 1954 as part of the Chicago Jury Project.104 The recording had the consent 
of  the  trial  judges,  but  not  the  jurors.  On  coming  to  light,  the  practice  was  subject  to 
widespread condemnation  and a  spate  of  legislative  activity to  ban the recording of  jury 
deliberations followed.105  In the half century that followed, there was little appetite for a 
repeat  exercise,  although  in  1997  CBS,  a  major  commercial  US  network,  broadcast  a 
documentary containing actual jury deliberations from four criminal trials in Arizona.106 
Whilst  a  number  of  American  commentators  have  argued  for  the  recording  of 
deliberations,107 the notion has never been seriously entertained in England and Wales, given 
the assault it would represent on the secrecy of the jury room. In 2002, Robertshaw proposed 
what he termed an ‘ethical bugging procedure’ whereby jurors would give their consent to the 
possibility of their  deliberations being recorded, but would not  know if  they were in fact  
being recorded.108 Despite the well-documented difficulties in combating juror misconduct in 
the internet age,109 Robertshaw’s suggestion essentially advocates the use of a sledgehammer 
to crack a nut. Such an approach would undermine the very rationale on which jury trial is 
based, namely the judgment of one’s peers without state interference. The prospect that ‘Big 
Brother’  was  always  listening,  or  indeed  that  defendants  might  be  able  to  access  the 
recordings,  would  almost  certainly  lead  to  deliberations  becoming  formulaic  and 
unimaginative, and potentially limit the candour of juror contributions. This article does not 
therefore  consider  the  recording  of  deliberations  to  be  a  viable  reform which  should  be 
pursued, in order to explain verdicts or for any other reason. 
(b) The mixed tribunal
An alternative approach would be to introduce a form of collaborative court, whereby one or  
more professional judges would cross the threshold to join lay members and form a panel 
103 Whilst section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 expressly prohibits recording in court precincts in England and Wales, 
the secrecy rule can be traced back to the eighteenth century. See J Hunter, ‘Jury Deliberations and the Secrecy Rule: The Tail  
that Wags the Dog?’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 809.
104
 The project appeared in print as H Kalven and H Zeisel, The American Jury (Little, Brown and Co 1966)
105 See S Kassin and L Wrightsman, The American Jury on Trial: Psychological Perspectives (New York: Hemisphere, 1988) 
pp 13-14; S S  Diamond and N Vidmar, ‘Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics’ (2001) 87(8) Virginia Law 
Review 1857 at 1867.
106 See W R Bagley, ‘Jury Room Secrecy: Has the Time Come to Unlock the Door?’ (1999) 32 Suffolk University Law Review 
481 at 486-488.
107 See T Lewis, ‘Toward a Limited Right of Access to Jury Deliberations’ (2006) 58 Federal Communications Law Journal 
195 at 207-211; C H Ruprecht, ‘Are Verdicts, Too, Like Sausages?: Lifting the Cloak of Jury Secrecy’ (1997) 146 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 217 at 241-250. 
108 See P Robertshaw, ‘For Auld Land Syne – Towards the Demise of the Jury’ (2002) 66(4) J of  Criminal Law 338 at 351-
352. The recording of deliberations to facilitate the investigation of misconduct has been suggested by other commentators also. 
See Ferguson, above n 40, pp 207-208.
109 See for exmple, E Brickman, J Blackman, R Futterman and J Dinnerstein, ‘How Juror Internet Use has Changed the 
American Jury Trial’ (2008) 1(2) Journal of Court Innovation 287; N Haralambous, ‘Educating Jurors: Technology, the Internet 
and the Jury System’ (2010) 19(3) Information and Communications Technology Law 255. See also Thomas, ‘Avoiding’, 
above n 63. 
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which would deliberate on the question of guilt. This would sidestep the difficulty of judges 
having to draft lengthy question lists and juries having to formulate a response. One of the 
professional  judges  would  assume  responsibility  for  drafting  the  verdict,  along  with  a 
summary  of  the  reasons  for  the  decision.  This  practice  evolved  to  become  relatively 
commonplace across Europe in the nineteenth century, although three separate variations of  
the collaborative approach have been identified by Jackson and Kovalev.110 
First,  there is the German  Schöffengericht  model,  whereby a professional judge is 
joined on the bench by two lay judges. The Schöffen hold the same full judicial status as the 
professional judges and can outvote them on questions of either fact or law.111 It is, however, 
for the professional judge alone (even if outvoted) to draft the judgment of the majority. This 
will contain a list of reasons for the verdict, which may include comments on the weight of  
the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.112 Adopted in many German-speaking countries, 
as well as certain Scandanavian and  Eastern European jurisdictions, the precise composition 
may vary, as may the type of offence for which it is used and the possible sentences that may 
be passed.113 An alternative is the French model, which is distinctive owing to its high ratio of 
lay jurors to professional judges; the Cours d’Assises operates with three professional judges 
and nine lay members. In this setting the lay members do not formally join the bench, but 
retire  to  deliberate  with  the  professional  judges.  Like  the  German  model,  the  court  is  
collectively responsible  for  questions  of  law and  fact,  and  lay judges  may  outvote  their 
professional colleagues. However, in contrast to the German model, the President of the Court  
prepares questions for the jury that are generally straightforward, factually oriented, and may 
be answered by yes  or no responses.  Deliberations take place in secret,  with anonymous  
voting on each question posed. The presiding judge then announces the verdict in open court,  
and reveals whether the jury voted (by two-thirds majority) ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in response to each 
of the questions.114 The third variation recognised by Jackson and Kovalev is  the  ‘expert 
assessor model’  whereby certain lay professionals with expertise in a given area join the  
judges so  that  their  knowledge or  experience might  enhance the  quality of  the  decision-
making process.  Common in France and Germany,  they share  some  similarities  with the 
former institution of the English special jury115 and generally offer some form of justification 
for their verdicts. Auld LJ also envisaged some role for this form of tribunal in the English  
criminal justice system, whereby defendants in serious and complex fraud cases would be 
given a choice of a trial by judge alone, or a judge sitting with two lay experts.116 
One could argue that each of the variations of the collaborative model combines the 
advantages of pure lay juries with those of trial by judge or judges alone. Lay persons usually 
comprise  the  majority  of  such  tribunals,  thereby  preserving  the  advantages  traditionally 
associated with the common law jury. In acting as a bulwark against excessive state authority,  
the involvement of lay people may serve to enhance the legitimacy of the verdict. It may also 
110 Jackson and Kovalev, above n 71, pp 94-95.
111 M. Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Procedure (Oxford: Hart, 2012) 50.
112 Ibid. A sample judgment is contained in Annex 2 of Professor Bohlander’s book: ibid, p 290.
113 Jackson and Kovalev, above n 71, p 97.The authors note that while the total number of judges may vary, the number of lay 
judges must always exceed the number of professional judges by one.  
114 V P Hans and C M Germain, ‘The French Jury at a Crossroads’ (2011) 86 Chicago-Kent Law Review 737 at 756-757.
115 See J Oldham, ‘Special Juries in England: Nineteenth Century Usage and Reform’ (1987) 8(2) Journal of Legal History 148.
116 Auld, above n 62, pp 213-214. This suggestion was not acted upon by Parliament.
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improve the quality of the deliberation process, since lay members may inject a wide range of  
social  values  and  professional  experiences,  which  may  counteract  more  limited  or  case-
hardened attitudes  in  the  professional  judiciary.  In  addition,  the  presence  of  professional 
judges might ensure that mixed juries would follow the law rather than their emotions, and 
would not rush their decisions.117 The contribution of professional triers of fact would also be 
helpful  in drafting meaningful  and articulate reasons for the verdict,  which would add to 
public confidence in criminal trials.118 However, collaborative panels are lacking in one of the 
fundamental qualities of Anglo-American jury trial, namely that the decision-making process 
should rest with lay persons alone.  Although it has been suggested that the likely ratio of any 
such mixed panel  (of  12 lay persons to  one professional  judge)  may counterbalance this 
concern,119 there remains a risk that it may be perceived as a ‘court of nodders’.120 Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that, as professional elites who possess a certain status, judges  
tend to dominate collaborative deliberations, with lay members assuming a back seat role.121 
The  fact  remains  that  the  nature  and  extent  of  likely  judicial  influence  in  collaborative 
decision-making is an unknown quantity, whereas the pure lay model at least ensures that all  
communications between the state (in the guise of the judge) and the trier of fact are open to  
public scrutiny.122 For that reason, the adoption of a mixed panel method, while in many ways 
an attractive means of embedding explained verdicts in criminal trials, would be unlikely to 
carry  sufficient  legitimacy  in  the  common  law  world.  It  therefore  does  not  represent  a 
sustainable method of introducing explained verdicts.
(c) Lay facilitation
In a paper published in 2012, Catriona Murdoch mooted the idea of using oath-bound lay 
persons as ‘jury monitors’,  who would observe deliberations to ensure that no extraneous 
material was introduced.123 However, arguably there is a wider role that might usefully be 
performed by lay persons; they could undertake a much more active role in assisting juries in 
drawing up coherent and articulate explanations for their verdicts.  Lay facilitators are widely 
used  within  so-called  ‘citizens’  juries’,  which  are  increasingly  commonplace  beyond  the 
context  of  the  criminal  trial  throughout  the  United  Kingdom,  Australia  and  parts  of 
continental Europe. The concept involves assembling stakeholders within a local community 
to deliberate around matters  of  public administration that  affect  them,  ranging from local  
planning  and  environmental  issues,  the  prioritisation  of  budgets,  and  the  organisation  of 
healthcare and education.124 Essentially, the process revolves around the assumption that high 
quality information and intensive, yet  structured, deliberation can generate consensus on a 
117 J E Dudzinski, ‘Justification for Juries: A Comparative Perspective on Models of Jury Composition’ (2013) University of 
Illinois Law Review 1625 at 1639. 
118 It is also possible, however, that an overly legalistic approach to drafting reasons could actually serve to render the verdict 
more obscure and less accessible to the wider public.
119 P Fitzpatrick, ‘The British Jury: An Argument for the Reconstruction of the Little Parliament’ (2010) 6 Cambridge Student 
Law Review 1 at 11.
120 N P Kovalev, ‘Lay Adjudication of Crimes in the Commonwealth of Independent States: An Independent and Impartial Jury 
or a “Court of Nodders?”’ (2004) 11(2/3) Journal of East European Law 123.
121 S K Ivkovic, ‘Exploring Lay Participation in Legal Decision-Making: Lessons from Mixed Tribunals’ (2007) 40(2) Cornell 
International Law Journal 429 at 440-443. 
122 V P Hans, ‘Jury Systems Around the World’ (2008) 4 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 275 at 290.
123 C Murdoch, ‘The Oath and the Internet'’ (2012) 176 (11) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 149.
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particular issue among a diverse group of individuals.125 The mechanics of a typical English 
citizens’ jury have been described in the following terms: 
A citizens' jury brings together a group of approximately 12-16 citizens, selected to 
be representative of the local community, to consider an issue in depth (usually over  
3-5 days). The jury are fully briefed and hear information from and question expert  
witnesses, before discussing the issue amongst themselves. They then draw up their 
conclusions, facilitated by a trained moderator. A jury is not used to make binding 
decisions, but to advise or make recommendations about a policy.126
For present purposes, it can be noted that that the conclusions drawn up by citizens’ juries are  
‘designed  to  explain  the  jury’s  judgements  and  recommendations’.127 Despite  discernible 
differences in their operational context, there is considerable overlap between criminal juries 
and  citizens’  juries  in  terms  of  how  they  are  assembled  and  how they  are  expected  to 
perform.128 One  key difference  relates  to  deliberations.  For  their  part,  criminal  jurors  are 
often unsure how to structure their deliberations.129 Forepersons tend to be chosen after a very 
short  space of time,  with relatively little  discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of a 
particular  individual  or  their  suitability  for  the  role.130 Studies  have  also  revealed  that 
forepersons and other perceived ‘high ranking’ members of groups take a greater proportion 
of turns in speaking, often dominate discussions, and tend to be more influential over the  
verdict.131 Though large-scale studies have been rare, there is some evidence to suggest that 
the  quality  of  deliberation  quality  tends  to  be  high,  and  is  characterised  by  thorough,  
124 For an overview see P McLaverty, ‘Is Deliberative Democracy the Answer to Representative Democracy’s Problems? A 
Consideration of the UK Government’s Programme of Citizen Juries’ (2009) 45(4) Representation 379; A Coote and J 
Lenaghan, Citizens' Juries: Theory into Practice (London: Institute for Public Policy Research 1997).
125 J Gastil, P E Deess, P J Weiser and C Simmons, The Jury and Democracy: How Jury Deliberation Promotes Civic 
Engagement and Political Participation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p 180.
126 Department of Enterprise, Transport and the Regions, Modernising Local Government: Local Democracy and Community 
Leadership (London: HMSO, 1998), para 4.12.
127 G Smith and C Wales, ‘Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy’ (2000) 48(1) Political Studies 51 at 59. There has 
been criticism that the conclusions of citizens’ juries are sometimes not made publicly available: McLaverty, above n 122, p 
382.
128 L Carson and R Lubensky, ‘Citizens’ Juries Pave the Way to the Law Courts’ (2008) 33(1) Alternative Law Journal 10 at 
11.
129 V P Hans and N Vidmar, Judging the Jury (Perseus Publishing 1986)  p 102. In an English study which interviewed people 
who had experienced jury service 67% of them stated that jurors should be given more information about how to conduct 
deliberations:  Thomas, above n 54, p 39. This finding was discussed by Lord Judge in R v Thompson (2010) 2 Cr App Rep 27 
at 266. 
130 See D J Devine, L D Clayton, B B Dunford, R Seying, and J Pryce, ‘Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research 
on Deliberating Groups’ (2001) 7(3) Psychology, Public Policy and Law 622 at 697; L Ellison and V Munro, ‘Getting to (not) 
Guilty: Examining Jurors' Deliberative Processes in, and Beyond, the Context of a Mock Rape Trial’ (2010) 30(1) Legal 
Studies 74 at 88-89; S S Diamond and J D Casper, ‘Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the 
Civil Jury’ (1992) 26 Law and Society Review 513 at 547.
131 Devine et al, ibid, p 696; R Hastie, S Penrod and N Pennington, Inside the Jury (Harvard University Press 2002) p 28.   
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evidence-driven debates.132 However, in a larger study exploring data obtained from jurors 
and legal professionals associated with 179 criminal trials in Indiana, Devine et al found that  
the overall quality was variable. Juries often performed well in terms of understanding their  
instructions and reviewing the evidence, but problems arose in relation to securing equal input 
from  all  members,  adopting  an  evidence-driven  deliberation  style,  and  avoiding 
factionalism.133 While the available evidence is mixed, it seems somewhat anomalous that an 
institution  charged  with  such  an  important  civic  responsibility  is  free  to  undertake  its  
deliberation process in an unfettered manner without any oversight mechanism in place. By 
contrast,  the  deliberations  of  citizens’  juries  are  organised  to  be  a  fair,  transparent  and 
inclusionary process based around 
judicious argument, critical listening, and earnest decision making…full deliberation 
includes a careful examination of a problem or issue, the identification of possible 
solutions,  the establishment  or  reaffirmation of evaluative criteria,  and the use of 
these criteria in identifying an optimal solution.134 
The responsibility for overseeing the deliberation falls to a group facilitator who, unlike the 
foreperson of a criminal jury, will usually be trained to encourage members to articulate their 
individual views, deal with information in a systematic and rigorous way, and find common 
ground in evaluating it.135 In  a systematic review of criminal jury decision-making studies 
from 1955 to 1999, covering some 206 empirical studies, Devine et al concluded that high  
quality deliberation was dependent on the presence of certain procedural criteria, namely:
(a) thorough review of the facts in evidence, (b) accurate jury-level comprehension of 
the  judge's  instructions,  (c)  active  participation  by  all  jurors,  (d)  resolution  of 
differences through discussion as opposed to normative pressure, and (e) systematic  
matching of case facts to the requirements for the various verdict options.136
In an effort to ensure that these criteria are present,  insofar as possible,  throughout the 
deliberation process, criminal juries might also  make use of a trained facilitator,  in  the 
same way as citizens’ juries. This facilitator would join jurors in their deliberations, and 
their  role  would  be  limited to overseeing  and  assisting the  deliberative process and 
authoring the reasons for the verdict at the end of the deliberation.  He or she would 
have a basic knowledge of the core elements of law and procedure, but would also be 
132 S S Diamond, N Vidmar, M Rose and L Ellis, ‘Inside the Jury Room - Evaluating Juror Discussions during Trial’ (2003) 
87 Judicature 54; S S Diamond, B Murphy and M Rose, ‘Kettleful of Law in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and 
Next Steps’ (2012) 106 Northwestern University Law Review 1537; J Gastil, S Burkhalter and L W Black, ‘Do Juries 
Deliberate? A Study of Deliberation, Individual Difference, and Group Satisfaction at a Municipal Courthouse’ (2007) 38 
Small Group Research 337.
133 J D Devine, J Buddenbaum, S Houp, D P Stolle and N Studebaker, ‘Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary Examination in 
Criminal Juries’ (2007) 4(2) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 273 at 288.
134 J Gastil, Democracy in Small Groups: Participation, Decision Making, and Communication (New Society 1993) p 22.
135 See further, K N Dillard, ‘Envisioning the Role of Facilitation in Public Deliberation’ (2013) 41(3) Journal of Applied 
Communications Research 217. 
136 Devine et al, ‘Jury Decision Making’, above n 128, p 707. 
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familiar with group dynamics and evidence-based decision-making.137 As Darbyshire et al 
note  in  their  2001  meta-analysis,  ‘[i]f  there  is  one  point  upon  which  nearly  every 
commentator  agrees  it  is  that  juries  have  a  great  deal  of  difficulty  understanding  and 
applying judicial instructions.’138 To this end,  the facilitator  could  also  act as a conduit 
between the jurors and the court, clarifying any aspects of written instructions or a ‘route to 
verdict’ that had been issued. He or she could also encourage clear and articulate decision-
making by ensuring that only the relevant material facts are considered and that the law is 
properly applied. 
 The main strength of involving a facilitator in the deliberations is that it would allow 
an explained verdict to be issued with the guarantee that it  had been reached without the  
presence of the trial judge in the jury room. This form of verdict could inspire confidence and 
a sense of procedural fairness in defendants, complainants and the wider public. Whilst, for 
present purposes, the key advantage is likely to be the capacity of the facilitator to assist in 
the provision of  reasons,  other benefits  would also follow. A trained outsider  could help 
structure discussions, rending them more efficient  yet  more rigorous. Likewise, he or she  
could safeguard against  the  risks  of  ‘groupthink’,139 domination of the  process  by certain 
individuals, and could also act as a safeguard against collective bias and various forms of  
misconduct.140 Given these improvements to the quality of the  process, it is also suggested 
that the quality of the  outcome would be similarly enhanced, with a greater chance that the 
verdict itself would be accurate.
While the use of trained facilitators is unknown in respect of criminal juries, their 
use is not uncommon within the criminal justice system as a whole. Within mediation and 
alternative justice settings, facilitators are regularly used to ensure that the discussion is  
structured, coherent, inclusive and fair, whilst ‘ownership’ of the process is said to rest with 
the parties themselves.141 Indeed, effective facilitation is often regarded as a key benchmark 
of success in the evaluation of restorative justice programmes.142 A myriad of questions 
would need to be addressed in terms of how to give effect to such a radical change to jury 
decision-making. One option would be for courts to draw up lists of approved facilitators 
who would either be employed directly by H.M. Courts & Tribunals Service or provide 
services as freelancers. While the cost implications of a professionalised pool of facilitators 
may be significant, consideration could be afforded to training volunteers to undertake the 
role.143 
137 See further, S Shelton, ‘Jury Decision Making: Using Group Theory to Improve Deliberation’ (2006) 34(4) Politics and 
Policy 706.
138 P Darbyshire, A Maughan and A Stewart, What can the English legal system learn from jury research published up to 2001? 
(London: Kingston Business School/Kingston Law School, Kingston University, 2002) p 25. See also Thomas, above n 54, 
who found that two-thirds of jurors surveyed stated that they would have liked more information on conducting deliberations (p 
39). 
139 See further, D H Mitchell and D Eckstein, ‘Jury Dynamics and Decision-Making; A Prescription for Groupthink’ (2009) 
1(1) International J. of Academic Research 163.
140 It is also possible that a particular juror, group of jurors or the accused, could intimidate the facilitator. However, 
comprehensive training, along with an appropriate oversight mechanism, could help to offset this risk.
141 J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p 145.  
142 J Braithwaite, ‘Setting Standards for Restorative Justice’ (2002) 42(3) British Journal of Criminology 563 at 574.
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The prospect of opening the doors of the jury room to an outsider would undoubtedly 
attract considerable dissent. The key objection would most likely revolve around the concern 
that someone who was not party to the trial would then be placed in a position where he or  
she could  influence the  jurors.  It  would require  a  statutory reversal  of  the  long-standing 
common law rule in  Goby v Weatherill,144 which states that the presence of any non-juror 
during deliberations requires that the verdict be vitiated. The risk of undue influence, even 
unintentional, ought not to be dismissed lightly. However, it may be suggested that the status 
quo is even more conducive to undue influence, given the above-noted tendency of ‘high 
ranking’ members of the group to dominate the decision-making process. 
Once a verdict had been agreed, we propose that the facilitator would lead the jurors 
in the drafting of a narrative verdict outlining why the jury arrived at its conclusion on each  
count. These need not be detailed, but ought to present an outline as to why the jury accepted 
or  rejected  each  element  of  the  offence/defence.  Both  parties  would  then  be  given  the  
opportunity to make representations to the trial judge, who would then review the reasons to 
ensure that sufficient detail was given and that the law was followed. Inadequate expressions 
of reasons could then be returned to the jury to be reformulated. This aspect of the process 
would not be unproblematic since, as Jackson reminds us, jurors are not required to reach a  
verdict according to the law; rather they are bound to determine the case on the merits in  
accordance with the evidence.145 There is thus a clear risk that reasons which are determined 
by the trial judge to be legally inadequate, or poorly rationalised, may actually be factually 
adequate in the eyes of the jury. Such judicial oversight may erode the jury’s ability to inject 
‘lay acid’ into a professionalised and legalistic  arena,146 which is  one of  the fundamental 
rationales for the existence of the jury system in its current form. Moreover, the publication of  
reasons would most likely lead to the creation of new grounds of appeal, namely that the jury 
had failed to apply the law correctly or had not complied with its duty to provide reasons. 147 
To some extent, these concerns might be minimised through the issuing of robust judicial 
guidelines, though undoubtedly the strength of the jury as a form of ‘governance’ may be 
eroded. Ultimately,  however, any such decline in the political power of the jury would be 
offset by the introduction of greater transparency in the performance of its core function of 
determining innocence and guilt.148  
In summary, we concede that the introduction of a facilitator is not without potential 
problems. However, of the three options outlined above, this proposal seems best suited to  
maintaining  most  of  the  advantages  of  the  lay  jury  while  bringing  its  decision-making 
processes into line with contemporary standards of accountability and legitimacy.
143 Volunteers are already widely used by the Witness Service across England and Wales (see further R Mawby, ‘Public Sector 
Services and the Victim of Crime’ in S Walklate (ed), Handbook of Victims and Victimology (Cullompton: Willan, 2007) p 
209. Many mediation and restorative justice schemes across continental Europe also rely heavily on volunteer facilitators. See F 
Dünkel, P Horsfield and A Parosanu (eds) European Research on Restorative Juvenile Justice: Volume I Research and 
Selection of the Most Effective Juvenile Restorative Justice Practices in Europe: Snapshots from 28 EU Member States 
(Brussels: International Juvenile Justice Observatory, 2015).
144 [1915] 2 KB 674.
145 Jackson, ‘Making Jurors Accountable’, above n 11, p 523. 
146 Z Bankowski, ‘The Jury and Reality’ in Findlay and Duff, above n 6, p 20.
147 Lippke, above  n 90, p 316. 
148  Jackson,  ‘Unbecoming Jurors’, above n 66, p 301. 
20
Embedding Explained Jury Verdicts Legal Studies, 2017 DOI: 10.1111/lest.12174
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the ‘oracular verdict’149 of the jury is safe for the foreseeable future, both under 
the domestic law of England and, perhaps more crucially, under the European Convention on 
Human Rights. This should not, however, be the end of the matter.  Auld perhaps overstates 
the  advantages  of  an  explained  verdict  and  underplays  the  ability  of  ‘determined  and 
sufficiently  conspiratorial’150 jurors  to  hide  misconduct  or  prejudice  behind  carefully 
constructed reasons. Nevertheless, he makes persuasive arguments about the need for the jury 
to embrace accountability and so adapt to the norms of the modern world. In particular, the  
incorporation of reasons,  acknowledged by the law as beneficial  in a myriad of contexts,  
could be achieved with a little creativity and a willingness to modernise.  The provision of 
reasons might cause jurors to put more thought into their deliberations. It might also highlight 
irregularities in some, if not all, of the cases in which they occur. 
While we argue that explained verdicts represent a worthy reform, questions remain 
in relation to its precise parameters and content. It is unclear, for example, whether reasons 
ought to be given in circumstances of guilt, or innocence, or in both scenarios; what should  
happen in the event that jurors agree on an outcome but not on the reasons; and the nature and  
extent of the common law secrecy rule that would remain intact.151 Unease has also been 
voiced that such a move would spell the end of the political role of the jury as a buttress  
against the abuse of state power, as well as increasing the workload of both trial judges and  
the  Court  of  Appeal,  and  endangering  the  finality  of  the  verdict.152 These  concerns  are 
certainly  not  without  foundation  but,  in  our  view,  are  issues  that  are  ultimately  of  less 
importance than the overarching need to improve the accountability of the jury.
Certain supporters  of  the  jury are  perhaps guilty of  underestimating  its  ability to 
evolve  and  adapt  over  time,  as  demonstrated  by  the  reaction  of  governments  and 
commentators  to the Second Section decision and the submissions of states to the Grand 
Chamber in Taxquet. As Lord Devlin stated, the jury has been constructed ‘biologically rather 
than mechanically’.153 Just  as jurors  in  the  past  used an array of devices to  explain their 
verdicts, a range of options exist that should be actively considered in order to ensure the 
jury’s continued legitimacy as a core democratic institution. 
149 Auld, above n 62, p 168. 
150 Ibid. p 537. 
151 See further M Csere, ‘Reasoned Criminal Verdicts in the Netherlands and Spain: Implications for Juries in the United 
States’ (2013) 12 Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 415 at 434; Jackson, above n 11, pp 520-522. 
152 On these and other potential drawbacks of explained verdicts, see Lippke, above n  90, pp 323-330.
153 Devlin, above n 5, p 57.
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